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THE HISTORICAL SETTING OF BROWN AND
ITS IMPACT ON THE SUPREME COURT'S
DECISION
THE HONORABLE CONSTANCE BAKER MOTLEY
Judge Motley provides an insightful overview of the Brown v. Board of Education
decision in an historical context In addition to analyzing several Supreme Court
decisions that preceded Brown, Judge Motley focuses on the role of Thurgood
Marshall as both a strategist and tactician during this dynamic period in our
history. Judge Motley concludes by examining the immediate impact of Brown
on the civil rights movement in America.
r HE Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education
J1("Brown I")' holding racial segregation in public education uncon-
stitutional was no ordinary civil action such as we were accustomed to in
American jurisprudence. In both its procedural and substantive aspects
it was unique. Any attempt to analyze Brown I's substantive legal un-
derpinning or to revisit the Court's "all deliberate speed" remedy of
Brown 112 simply dwarfs its overriding historical, social, and political
significance in the life of this nation. Brown I was first and foremost
historic rectification of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Con-
stitution,3 the objective of which was to confer citizenship status on the
newly emancipated slaves and to debar the former slave-holding states
from denying to them the same rights which White citizens enjoyed
within the states. Specifically, Brown I recognized that the social policy
of segregation, which received the Supreme Court's judicial blessing in
1896 in Plessy v. Ferguson,4 violated the Fourteenth Amendment's guar-
antee of equal protection under the law. It also recognized, sub silentio,
that state-enforced racial segregation was not only a national disgrace,
but an international political embarrassment. In retrospect, if it had not
been for World War II, which forced the national government to con-
front and deal with the embarrassment created by segregation at home
and in our armed forces abroad, there would not have been a Supreme
Court decision as early as 1954 outlawing racial segregation in education.
In short, a necessary predicate to ending racial segregation by state gov-
ernments was a commitment by the national government to establish a
new American social policy.
Brown I was preceded by four foundation rulings: 1) Missouri ex rel
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown IM).
3. Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment provides in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § I.
4. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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Gaines v. Canada,5 which prevented Missouri from sending an African-
American student out of the state to receive a law school education
which White students received at home; 6 2) Sipuel v. Board of Regents of
the University of Oklahoma,7 which required Oklahoma to afford an Af-
rican-American woman a legal education within the state-an education
that had already been provided to White students;8 3) McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents,9 which also prohibited Oklahoma from segre-
gating an African-American male within its graduate school of education
once it had admitted him;' ° and 4) Sweatt v. Painter," wherein the
Court, upon comparing the facilities provided for White students at the
University of Texas Law School with those provided at a separate law
school for African-American citizens, ordered the admission of the plain-
tiff to the University of Texas Law School. 2
Each of these pre-Brown cases was decided within the "separate but
equal" context, although the validity of segregated education, per se, was
also being attacked. The student plaintiffs' lawyers, headed by Thurgood
Marshall, argued that it was unnecessary for the Court to hold segrega-
tion, per se, unconstitutional in order to grant the relief sought because,
in each instance, "separate but equal" facilities had not been provided.
In fact, in 1948, during reargument in Sipuel, a Supreme Court Justice
asked Thurgood Marshall whether he was seeking a ruling on the valid-
ity of segregation, per se, rather than on the lack of a "separate but
equal" institution, a ground on which Ms. Sipuel had already prevailed.
As I recall, Marshall responded in the negative. His answer, however,
was not spontaneous. Anticipating the question, Marshall had already
discussed this response with his legal staff and mentors. They all agreed
that a "yes" answer would be dangerously premature. Marshall rea-
soned that Sweatt was still working its way up through the state court
system in Texas. In that case, for the first time, a separate facility had
been hastily provided for the plaintiff soon after the lawsuit was filed.
Thus, Sweatt provided the first opportunity to demonstrate at trial that a
facility constructed for African-Americans under the "separate but
equal" doctrine was not, in fact, equal.
By way of background, it was common knowledge in 1948 that the
separate educational facilities provided by southern states for African-
American students were invariably inferior to those provided for White
students. It was also widely known at that time that the only African-
Americans in the country who received an education equal to that re-
ceived by Whites were those who attended the same schools as White
5. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
6. See id. at 352.
7. 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
8. See id. at 633.
9. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
10. See id. at 642.
11. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
12. See id. at 635-36.
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students. Therefore, if a Texas plaintiff demonstrated this inequality be-
tween the two educational systems, he would be entitled to his personal
and present constitutional right to immediate admission to the White in-
stitution. The underlying rationale of Thurgood Marshall and his associ-
ates was that the southern states could not afford to duplicate graduate
and professional-level education for its non-White citizens. These states,
therefore, would be forced to admit to existing facilities the few non-
Whites seeking education at that level.
Thurgood Marshall and his associates believed that once they frayed
the pattern of segregation at the graduate level, moving down the educa-
tional ladder would be a less onerous task. As early as 1936, in Pearson
v. Murray,'3 Marshall succeeded in gaining the admission of an African-
American to his home state's law school at the University of Maryland
Law School without adverse reaction. At that time, Maryland did not
provide separate law schools for non-Whites. This approach of filing law
suits where states did not provide separate institutions had been jointly
developed by Marshall and Charles Houston, Marshall's mentor and the
first full-time lawyer for the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People ("NAACP").
The Maryland case was followed in 1938 by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Gaines, the Missouri case. The Gaines decision, however, was
somewhat of a setback. Although the plaintiff, Lloyd Gaines, prevailed,
he was not admitted to the law school in Missouri as expected; nor did
the Court order his admission. Instead, the Court simply invalidated
Missouri's out-of-state scholarship program for African-American stu-
dents eligible for graduate and professional school education (which all
of the southern states had adopted to avoid integrating their all-White
institutions) and left it up to the State of Missouri to decide upon the
appropriate course of action. 4 The Court held that Missouri could pro-
vide equal protection to its citizens only by supplying equal education
within its own borders.' 5 Lloyd Gaines disappeared and did not apply
for admission after the Court's ruling. Missouri, however, proceeded to
build a separate law school for non-Whites at its all-Black Lincoln
University.
Other southern states did not give up such programs as a result of the
Gaines decision. In fact, no southern state followed Missouri's lead by
building a separate law school for non-White students-a bad omen for
the future. In short, the Supreme Court in Gaines lacked the courage to
follow Pearson and, more importantly, had no incentive to strike down
the "separate but equal" doctrine or segregation, per se, as
unconstitutional.
In Plessy v. Ferguson,'6 an 1896 case involving intrastate travel, the
13. 182 A. 590 (Md. 1936).
14. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351-52 (1938).
15. See id. at 351.
16. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
19921
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Supreme Court affirmed the power of the southern states to provide sepa-
rate-but-equal railroad facilities for African-Americans within their bor-
ders. Consequently, in 1938, no one expected that the required political
and legal pressure could be brought to bear on the entrenched and widely
accepted Plessy doctrine. This was due, in part, to the fact that the Afri-
can-American minority had no political leverage at that time. Moreover,
the NAACP had no litigation treasury, and Charles Houston, William
Hastie, and Thurgood Marshall were virtually the only civil rights law-
yers in the country.17
Three years after the Gaines decision, in 1941, America entered World
War II. Racial segregation was such an embarrassment to the country,
however, that we dared not resurrect our World War I slogan that pro-
claimed to the world that our entry into the war was "To Make The
World Safe For Democracy." Consequently, we fought World War II
without this slogan, which our segregated way of life manifestly contra-
dicted. Above all, Hitler was a racist.
After more than a decade of unemployment, many African-Americans
were given a chance, beginning in 1942, to participate in the prosperity
that accompanied the war effort pursuant to a campaign for jobs led by
the African-American labor leader, A. Philip Randolph. The jobs cam-
paign, which included a planned march on Washington, resulted in Pres-
ident Roosevelt's Executive Order 88028 which barred discrimination in
government employment and defense industries with government con-
tracts. The NAACP's daring and highly controversial campaign to end
segregation in higher education, therefore, was put on the back burner in
an effort to spare the national government further embarrassment
abroad. Because the war effort had stripped many local campaigns of
manpower and financial support, the NAACP focused its efforts on the
end of segregation in the Armed Forces. Thurgood Marshall and his
staff aided African-American servicemen facing harsh, unequal court
martial penalties. As a result, African-American servicemen abroad
joined the NAACP, resulting in its highest membership record to date.
At this time, Marshall was general counsel of the NAACP as well as
chief counsel of its legal arm, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tional Fund.
After the war ended in 1945, the legal attack on segregation in educa-
tion quickly resumed with the filing of the Sweatt case in 1946. A sub-
stantial segment of the African-American community feared that such a
head-on approach would meet with disaster-a reaffirmation of the "sep-
arate but equal" doctrine in the face of steady progress on the political
17. Hastie was Houston's cousin and another Marshall mentor. Both Harvard-edu-
cated lawyers with outstanding scholastic records and credentials, Hastie and Houston
each won a number of civil rights cases in the Supreme Court. See Genna McNeil,
Groundwork: Charles Hamilton Houston and the Struggle for Civil Rights 3-11 (1983);
Gilbert Ware, William Hastie: Grace Under Pressure 142-174 (1984).
18. Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1941).
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front in the area of race relations, such as Roosevelt's Executive Order
8802.19
During the 1951 trial of the Topeka, Kansas school desegregation
case,2 0 a totally new theory developed for attacking the validity of segre-
gation, per se, in education. This theory proposed that state-imposed
segregation itself had an adverse psychological effect on the ability of
African-American children to learn.2 Kansas permitted, but did not re-
quire, large cities to segregate African-American school children. It had
only one such city, Topeka, that had a relatively large population of Afri-
can-Americans. These individuals had moved to Topeka in order to
work for the railroad at the turn of the century. Otherwise, Kansas was
fairly rural, and segregation there was not generally authorized. In fact,
Kansas was admitted to the Union as a free state.
The statute permitting such segregation was limited to the high school
level. Dr. Kenneth Clark, a psychologist, and other social scientists de-
veloped the psychological evidence that tended to prove that Black chil-
dren saw themselves as inferior. This evidence reflected the perceptions
of Black school children regarding the value of Black dolls and, hence,
their own value. The federal district judge in Kansas found as a fact that
segregation had an adverse effect on the ability of Black children to
learn.22 The Supreme Court accepted this finding as a basis for its unani-
mous decision in Brown I that segregation violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.23 As Chief Justice Earl Warren
said, segregation affects the "hearts and minds [of Negro children] in a
way unlikely ever to be undone."24
This new approach to attacking segregation, per se, in education had
been inspired by Mendez v. Westminister School District,' a 1946 Cali-
fornia case that struck down the segregation of Mexican children in Cali-
fornia public schools. In Mendez, the court held that the school set aside
for Mexican-Americans was inferior to the schools attended by White
children.26 Viewed from the community's perception of the situation, the
19. See id.
20. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951).
21. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n. 1l (1954) (Brown 1).
22. See id at 494.
23. See id. at 495.
24. Id at 494. The following passage from Chief Justice Earl Warren's opinion im-
pliedly refers to Clark's psychological evidence: "To separate [grade school and high
school children]... from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their
race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Id
25. 64 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Cal. 1946), aff'd, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947).
26. See id at 551. The district court's unequivocally strong language was radically
new at the time the decision was issued. According to the court:
The equal protection of the laws pertaining to the public school system in Cali-
fornia is not provided by furnishing in separate schools the same technical facil-
ities, text books and courses of instruction to children of Mexican ancestry that
are available to the other public school children regardless of their ancestry. A
paramount requisite in the American system of public education is social equal-
1992]
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court found that, in the judgment of the community, the Mexican-Amer-
ican school was not as good as the school attended by the White
children.
In connection with its decision in Brown I, the Supreme Court ordered
a number of unusual procedural steps. For instance, in 1952, before the
first argument, the Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari before judg-
ment to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in order to
hear a case involving segregation in a public school under federal juris-
diction.27 Moreover, in 1953, after the first argument in the five com-
bined school desegregation cases then before it, the Court ordered the
cases reargued and briefed with respect to both the several substantive
issues and the relief to which the plaintiffs would be entitled.2" It consol-
idated the five cases for reargument in its 1953 order, including the Dela-
ware case in which the highest court of Delaware had outlawed
segregation in Delaware's public schools, as well as the cases from Vir-
ginia and South Carolina.29
In retrospect, it now seems clear that the members of the Supreme
Court, in reaching their decision in Brown 1, were undoubtedly influ-
enced by the fact that, in 1948, President Truman ordered an end to
segregation in the nation's Armed Forces, the foremost symbol of our
home-grown racism. 30 As noted above, Truman's actions reversed long-
standing national policy with respect to our Armed Forces that predated
the Supreme Court's 1896 decision approving racial segregation.3
Although African-Americans apparently fought in integrated situations
in the Revolutionary War, those who volunteered to fight in the Civil
War were segregated in separate units. 32 Thereafter, the Army remained
segregated until 1948.
Thus, by 1952, national policy with respect to racial segregation had
changed significantly. The nation's capitol, Washington D.C., was qui-
etly beginning to desegregate with respect to privately owned places of
public accommodation such as theaters, restaurants and hotels, though
schools remained segregated. Restaurants in public buildings were either
quietly desegregated or had never instituted the policy. Congress, in fact,
legislatively controlled Washington, D.C. and could have outlawed seg-
ity. It must be open to all children by unified school association regardless of
lineage.
Id. at 549.
The court further stated that "[i]t is also established by the record that the methods of
segregation prevalent in the defendant school districts foster antagonisms in the children
and suggest inferiority among them where none exists." Id.
27. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498 (1954).
28. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 345 U.S. 972, 972-73 (1953).
29. See id. at 972.
30. Exec. Order No. 9981, 3 C.F.R 722 (1943-1948).
31. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
32. See Howard J. Jones, Letters in Protest of Race Prejudice in the Army during the
American Civil War, in XLI The Journal of Negro History 97, 97-98 (Lorraine A. Wil-
liams ed., 1976).
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regated schooling. It chose not to do so, however, for obvious political
reasons. Without a commitment by the federal government to end segre-
gation in the Armed Forces and in the District of Columbia, segregation
in southern states would not have abated. The opposition simply would
have pointed to the national government as the maker of public policy.
A critical aspect of the Court's opinion in Brown I was its unanimity.
In reaching its truly historic decision, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote
an uncharacteristically straightforward opinion that simply turned the
Court's attention to the future, while never revisiting or analyzing the
constitutional injustice of the past century wrought by Plessy. In fact,
the Court never even mentioned Plessy's disingenuous holding that racial
segregation in intrastate transportation did not denote the inferiority of
African-Americans. In Gayle v. Browder,3" the Montgomery bus boycott
case, the Court finally overruled Plessy without so much as a hearing or
opinion. The Court simply cited Brown I in its affirmance of the lower
federal court's opinion banning segregation on local buses.'
The majority in Plessy knew full-well that racial segregation in trans-
portation was a state-imposed badge of servitude, as Justice Harlan's dis-
sent in Plessy indicates.3" In retrospect, it appears that the Court in
Plessy was trying to remove from the federal forum responsibility for pro-
tecting the rights of former slaves by approving the "separate but equal"
fiction. In its decision, the Plessy Court apparently hoped to put a cap on
a century of national turmoil and division over the race question in the
American community.
Plessy's most devastating result, however, was its reaffirmation of a
majority of the population's belief in the inherent inferiority of African-
Americans. Many schools and other institutions in the North that had
accepted African-Americans after the Civil War pursuant to their duty
under Reconstruction, subsequently abandoned their private affirmative
action programs after the Court decided Plessy.36 Thus, Plessy's impact
on American social history was not limited to street cars. The forty year
period from 1896 to 1936 was, perhaps, the bleakest in our long struggle
for racial equality.
When the Supreme Court decided Brown I in 1954, no one expected a
unanimous decision. As we now realize, however, unanimity was abso-
lutely necessary to the implementation of Brown I, the Supreme Court's
most controversial decision at that time. In another unprecedented pro-
cedural move, the Supreme Court, after Brown I, ordered reargument of
the remedy to be provided to the plaintiffs in the Brown consolidated
cases. Specifically, the "all deliberate speed" remedy enunciated by
33. 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
34. See id. at 903.
35. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 562 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
36. The class yearbooks at Exeter Academy, Exeter, New Hampshire, prior to 1896




Brown 11 seems to have been dictated by the class action nature of the
cases. All prior school desegregation cases before the Supreme Court
had been suits by individual plaintiffs at the college or graduate level,
with each plaintiff asserting his personal and present constitutional right
to admission to a White institution.
The realities embraced by the decision also dictated its remedy. The
remedy was apparently designed to placate the White resistance which
pleaded unreadiness. The "all deliberate speed" brake on school desegre-
gation, however, had no such effect. Federal troops were finally required
to enforce the new law of the land in Arkansas and Mississippi, and were
ready to do so in Alabama before George Wallace stepped aside from the
schoolhouse door. The Court finally put an end to "all deliberate speed"
jurisprudence in 1964 in Griffin v. School Board of Prince Edward
County,3 7 thereby withdrawing support for recalcitrant federal district
judges and school officials. The opposition, consisting now mainly of
hard-core White racists, has never given up.
One result of Brown I that had not been anticipated was its psychologi-
cal impact on African-American communities around the South. This
psychological effect manifested itself in a grass-roots anti-segregation re-
volt that took everyone by surprise in Montgomery, Alabama in 1956
with the bus boycott initiated by Rosa Park's refusal to move to the back
of the bus. These communities understood that dismantling the segre-
gated school system would take time and would even be resisted by some
elements in the African-American communities themselves who benefit-
ted from segregation. Many African-American communities initiated ef-
forts to bring down racial segregation in local transportation, department
store lunch counters, and in municipal government generally. They
targeted "Jim Crow" institutions that all African-American adults fre-
quented on a daily basis and, unlike the experience of school desegrega-
tion, met no resistance to change from the African-American
community.38
In the decade following Brown I, the Supreme Court, in a series of
equally historic decisions, struck down racial segregation in all other ar-
eas of American public life, including southern courthouses. 39 The
37. 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964).
38. While many African-American teachers feared loss of jobs, these same fears were
not shared by local bus riders, department store lunch counter enthusiasts and interstate
travelers.
39. See, e-g., Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963) (courthouses); Watson v.
City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 539 (1963) (public parks, playgrounds); Turner v. City
of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350, 353 (1962) (per curiam) (municipally owned airport restau-
rant); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 717 (1961) (municipally
owned parking lot restaurant); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879, 879 (1955) (per
curiam) (public golf courses); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971,
971 (1954) (per curiam) (municipally owned amphitheater); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 967-68 (4th Cir. 1963) (hospitals), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
938 (1964); Dawson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 220 F.2d 386, 387 (4th Cir.) (public
beaches), aff'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
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Court seemed to realize that desegregated schools could not coexist with
segregated local buses, recreational facilities, and lunch counters. Once
Brown had put a hole into the dam of segregation, even the Supreme
Court's "all deliberate speed" doctrine could not hold back the dawn of a
new day.' With congressional enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,41 legal segregation in America died. This is Brown's legacy.
40. See Joseph B. Robison, Protection of Associations from Compulsory Disclosure of
Membership, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 614, 615 (1958).
41. See Pub. L. 88-352, title II, §§ 201-07, 78 Stat. 243, 243-45 (1964) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1988)).

